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Common Carrier Liability Under the 
Copyright Act of 1976 
I
n just twenty years, the cable tele-
vision industry in America has 
grown from an infant enterprise, 
serving only isolated communities with 
limited programming, to a multi-mil-
lion dollar giant, serving both urban and 
rural areas alike. In addition to provid-
ing communities with distant broadcast 
signals, cable television now offers 
round-the-clock movies, sports, news, 
music, and even exclusive weekly serials. 
Currently attracting over 250,000 new 
subscribers each month,l cable, or 
community antenna television (CATV), 
has proven itself to be a viable alterna-
tive to advertiser-supported broadcasting. 
The cable industry's rapid growth has 
not been untroubled, however. Since 
the early days of cable television, 
CATV systems prospered, not by origi-
nating their own programming,2 but by 
distributing the broadcast signals of in-
dividual television stations to dist:mt 
communities that suffered from poor 
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television reception. To improve recep-
tion, cable companies would install 
powerful receiving antennae on the out-
skirts of subscribing communities. If re-
ception was still poor, then the cable 
company would hire a communications 
common carrier to receive and strengthen 
distant broadcast signals and retransmit 
them to the cable system's main receiv-
ing antenna or "headend" for subse-
quent distribution to the subscribing 
community via cables running directly 
into the homes of paying customers. 
Ordinarily, the common carrier would 
broadcast television signals without 
ever obtaining the permission of the 
television stations and without ever 
compensating the copyright owners for 
the right to transmit their programs.3 
This practice infuriated television copy-
right owners, who realized that cable 
Copyright owners 
claim that common 
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systems were distributing their pro-
grams to viewers for a profit without 
paying for performance rights. 
The copyright owner of a television 
program profits by licensing television 
stations to broadcast the program in re-
turn for compensation. The amount of 
compensation often varies with the size 
of the broadcaster's pDtential audience. 
In 1968, the copyright owners of sever-
al television programs sued a CATV 
company for copyright infringement in 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Televi-
sion.4 The copyright owners argued 
that, under the Copyright Act of 19095 
then in effect, the CATV systems in-
fringed the owners' exclusive right to 
"publicly perform" their copyrighted 
programs. The Supreme Court rejected 
this argument and held that the CATV 
systems, in distributing broadcast sig-
nals containing copyrighted programs, 
did not "perform" the copyrighted 
works and so were not liable for 
infringement.6 
Eight years later, however, Congress 
imposed liability for such distributions 
when it enacted the Copyright Act of 
1976 (Act),7 which contains an exemption 
from liability for CA TV retransmissions 
of broadcast signals, provided the 
CATV system pays a compulsory 
licensing fee to the Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal.8 These fees are then apportioned 
among copyright owners who have 
established entitlement with the Copy~ 
right Royalty Tribunal.9 Under this 
scheme, Congress has provided for the 
continued growth of the cable industry 
and, at the same time, has ensured 
compensation to copyright owners. 
Recently, copyright problems arose 
with respect to another party necessary 
to the cable industry, namely, the 
communications common carrier. A 
common carrier is an intermediary paid 
by CATV systems to receive and 
transport television signals from distant 
broadcast stations to the CATV system's 
main receiving antenna or h.eadend for 
subsequent distribution to individual 
subs~ibers.lO Copyright owners claim 
that common carriers infringe their 
exclusive performance rights by re~ 
transmitting copyrighted television 
programs. This issue was raised in two 
recent cases involving communications 
common carriers: Eastern Microwave, 
Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc. (EMI)" and 
WON Continental Broadcasting Co. v. 
United Video, Inc. (WON).!2 
In EMI, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed 
the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of New York and 
found that the carrier was exempt from 
copyright liability.!3 In WON, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower 
court and held that the common carrier 
was not exempt from liability under the 
Act.!4 
This article examines these two cases 
and the conflicting resolutions by the 
second and seventh circuits of the 
carrier exemption issue and concludes 
that carriers that retransmit broadcast 
signals to CATV systems should be 
exempt from liability for copyright 
infringement. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act 
of 1976 gives a copyright owner the 
exclusive right to publicly perform 
copyrighted works. Under the Act's 
broad definition of "perform,"!5 the 
showing of a "motion picture or other 
audiovisual work" is a performance. 
Thus, the showing of a typical tele~ 
vision program, which qualifies as an 
"audiovisual work,"!6 is a performance 
under the Act. 
Ordinary television broadcasts are 
considered "primary transmissions," 
and television stations avoid "public 
performance" liability under the Act by 
paying licensing fees directly to copy~ 
right owners. CATV systems and carri~ 
ers that retransmit ordinary television 
signals to their subscribers are exempted 
from performance infringement provided 
they comply with § 111 of the Act. 
Subsections (c), (d) and (e) of § 111 
apply to CATV systems. These sub~ 
sections establish the compulsory 
licensing scheme discussed above. 
Subsection 111(a)(3) applies to common 
carriers and contains the so~called passive 
carrier exemption, which states: 
Only by maintaining 
its role as a passive 
ttmessenger for hire" 
can the common 
carrier avoid 
copyright liability. 
The secondary transmission of a 
primary transmission embodying 
a performance ... is not an infringe~ 
ment of copyright if.. .. 
(3) the secondary transmission is 
made by any carrier who has no 
direct or indirect control over the 
content or selection of the primary 
transmission or over the particular 
recipients of the secondary trans~ 
mission, and whose activities with 
respect to the secondary trans~ 
mission consist solely of providing 
wires, cables or other communi~ 
cations channels for the use of 
others .... !7 
The Act does not define the term 
"secondary transmission." However, if 
a carrier can meet the qualifications of 
this section, then its transmission is not 
an infringement of copyright. If, how~ 
ever, the carrier (i) exerts control over 
the content or selection of the original 
broadcast signal, (ii) exerts control over 
the recipients of its own retransmission, 
or (iii) in some manner uses its 
communications channels for its own 
purposes, then the exemption is inappli~ 
cable and the carrier becomes liable 
under § 1 06( 4) for copyright infringe~ 
ment. 
The Passive Carrier Exemption 
The primary issue raised in EMI and 
WON was whether the respective com~ 
mon carriers qualified for the passive 
carrier exemption under § 111(a)(3) of 
the Act. In determining whether the ex~ 
emption's three requirements were met, 
the courts examined all of the circum~ 
stances surrounding the challenged 
retransmissions. 
In 1982, Eastern Microwave, Inc. 
(EMI), a licensed communications 
carrier!8 retransmitting the broadcast 
signal ofWOR~TV in New York City,!9 
sought a declaratory judgment against 
Doubleday Sports, which owned the 
copyright to the New York Mets' games 
broadcast seasonally on WOR~TV.20 
The suit sought to establish that EMl's 
retransmissions qualified for the passive 
carrier exemption. EMI contended that 
it had, in retransmitting WOR~ TV's 
broadcast signal, exercised "no control 
over the content or selection of the 
primary transmission or over the 
recipients of the secondary transmission 
and that its activity is limited to 
providing wires" and other avenues of 
communication solely for the use of its 
customers, the CATV systems.21 
The lower court found against EMI 
for several reasons. First, the court 
found that, by choosing the WOR~ TV 
signal for satellite retransmission, EMI 
exercised "selection" of the primary 
transmission.22 Additionally, the court 
held that, by contracting with particular 
CATV systems that wished to receive 
the retransmissions, EMI exercised 
"control" over the recipients of its 
secondary transmission.23 Finally, the 
court held that, by aggressively market~ 
ing its ability to retransmit WOR~TV's 
signal by satellite, EMI evidenced that it 
was not providing its communications 
channels "solely for the use of others," 
but was instead "selling" the broadcast 
signal as a product for its own benefit.24 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court's decision.25 The appellate court 
recognized that EMI had the ability to 
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retransmit only one signal via satellite 
and that the "initial, one-time" selection 
of WOR-TV's signal was not "control 
over the content and selection of the 
primary transmission."26 The court also 
found that EMI did not exercise 
"control" over the particular recipients 
of its retransmission by contracting with 
various CATV systems. EMI, the court 
noted, was required, as a licensed 
communications carrier, to accept all 
reasonable requests for its service.27 
Finding that "no reasonable requests for 
its services was ever refused by EMI," 
the court concluded that there was no 
showing of "control" within the mean-
ing of the § 111 (a)( 3) requirement.28 As 
to the third and final requirement under 
§ 111(a)(3), the court found that EMl's 
advertising of its ability to transmit a 
particular signal was a "normal business 
activity,"29 which did not disrupt the 
fact that EMI was offering its communi-
cations services solely for the use of 
CATV systems that could not afford 
their own relay equipment.3o Accord-
ingly, the court held that EMl's 
retransmissions were exempt from 
infringement under § 111(a)(3).31 
The common carrier exemption, 
located in the same section of the Act as 
the cable television compulsory licen-
sing plan,32 was enacted to further the 
purposes of the compulsory licensing 
plan.33 Congress, in enacting the cable 
television compulsory licensing scheme, 
devised a compromise which provided 
compensation to copyright owners 
while ensuring the continued growth of 
the cable industry by removing the need 
for individual contracts between CATV 
systems and copyright owners.34 
In the 1960's, as CATV systems be-
came principally concerned with the 
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importation of distant broadcast sig-
nals,35 their dependency on the com-
mon carrier, as the transporter of those 
signals, increased. Recognizing that the 
cable industry would not flourish as in-
tended without a continuous supply of 
broadcast material,36 Congress created 
the common carrier exemption, which 
ensures that qualified carriers will not 
be subjected to the unwieldy process of 
negotiating with individual copyright 
owners for the performance rights to 
each retransmitted program.37 
By establishing the particular re-
quirements of the § 111 (a)( 3) exemp-
tion, however, Congress made clear its 
intention that the carrier's role was to be 
restricted to that of a non-contributing, 
passive intermediary between the broad-
caster and the CATV system. Thus, a 
carrier seeking the exemption may not 
add or subtract material from the 
broadcaster's primary transmission, or 
be selective in choosing its customers.38 
Only by maintaining this role as a 
passive "messenger for hire," can the 
carrier avoid liability. This scheme 
ensures a steady variety of broadcast 
material, which in tum encourages the 
growth of the cable industry, as 
Congress intended.39 
Had the lower court's decision in EMI 
been upheld on appeal, then Congress' 
intention would have been thwarted. 40 
The lower court would have withheld 
the exemption from EMI for having 
intially "selected" a particular broadcast 
signal to retransmit. This ruling would, 
in effect, have required all carriers to 
retransmit "every television broadcast 
of every television station in the 
country" in order to remain exempt. 41 
Additionally, the district court er-
Illustration by Ted Jarkiewicz 
roneously indicated that a carrier, by 
offering its services at a rate unaffordable 
to all CATV companies,42 would lose 
the exemption for exercising "selec-
tion" over the recipients of its retrans-
mission. Finally, the district court left 
unresolved the question of what type of 
advertising by a common carrier to 
attract customers would exploit a 
copyrighted program for commercial 
benefit, rather than provide services 
"solely for the use of" subscribers.43 
If carriers risked their exemption by 
engaging in activities such as choosing a 
signal, setting particular rates or adver-
tising, then carriers seeking to avoid 
copyright liability would have only two 
options left. First, a carrier could 
attempt to secure licenses from every 
copyright owner of every retransmitted 
program. Even if the carrier were 
successful in obtaining such licenses, 
licensing fees would amount to a 
second royalty payment to the copy-
right owner, even though the number of 
home viewers remained constant. Since 
the amount of royalties paid by a 
CATV system under the Act is 
designed to fluctuate with the number 
of home subscribers, additional licen-
sing payments by carriers would disrupt 
the scheme. 44 Second, a carrier that is 
unable or unwilling to obtain licenses 
would have no choice but to cease 
operations to avoid liability. This 
would impair the growth of the cable 
industry, which is the opposite of what 
Congress intended.45 
To fully effectuate Congress' intent 
to maintain the flow of programming to 
CATV systems, the common carrier ex-
emption must remain available to carri-
ers that initially select a particular 
broadcast signal to transmit, contract 
with all CATV systems able to meet 
their service rates or advertise their 
ability to offer a particular signal. Had 
the carrier in EMI added its own com-
munication to a retransmission or se-
lected to serve only particular CATV 
systems, then a different result might 
have occurred. These facts, however, 
were not present in EMI. 
Control Over The Primary 
Transmission 
In WON,46 Chicago television station 
WON began experimenting with the 
"vertical blanking interval" (VB!) of 
its broadcast signal. The VB! is the ex-
tremely short period of time needed for 
television circuitry to reset between 
frames.47 During this interval, coded in-
formation can be inserted for transmis-
sion along with the program material. 
This added information, known as 
"teletext," can be viewed on television 
sets equipped with special decoders. 
Teletext can appear as subtitles at the 
bottom of the television screen (as is 
done with closed-captions for the hear-
ing impaired) or may be displayed se-
parately as an entire screenful of typed 
information. WON's teletext was of the 
latter variety and consisted of local Chi-
cago news and a program schedule in-
serted in the VB! of its copyrighted nine 
o'clock p.m. national news program.48 
Viewers using a decoder could either 
watch the news program, or switch to 
the decoded teletext. 49 
Defendant United Video, a common 
carrier that retransmitted the WON sig-
nal via satellite, began stripping the tele-
text information out of the broadcast 
signal and substituting teletext supplied 
by Dow Jones before retransmitting the 
signal to CATV systems.50 WON sued 
United Video for copyright infringe-
ment and for a permanent injunction to 
prevent United Video from removing 
its teletext. The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, Eastern Division denied WON's 
motion for injunction and instead 
granted summary judgment for United 
Video.5! 
At the trial, WON argued that its 
entire broadcast signal (including its 
teletext) constituted the "primary 
transmission," and that the removal of 
any part of that signal, namely WON's 
teletext, amounted to "control of the 
primary transmission," an act that 
precluded the passive carrier exemption. 52 
The district court rejected this argu-
ment, however, and held that under 
§ 111(a)(3), the "primary transmis-
sion" is not the entire broadcast signal, 
but is limited to "the copyrighted 
works which are initially broadcast and 
retransmi tted. "53 
This determination compelled a fur-
ther inquiry. Since the district court 
defined "primary transmission" as the 
"copyrighted work," then United Video 
would be exerting "control over the pri-
mary transmission" only if the nine 
o'clock news and the simultaneously 
broadcast teletext amounted to a single 
copyrightable work. If the teletext and 
news program were copyrightable as 
In view of the 
carrier's intended 
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common carrier 
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message and replaces 
it with material from 
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separate works, then United Video's 
refusal to retransmit the teletext would 
not alter the "passive" character of its 
retransmission of the nine o'clock 
news. 
The district court, relying on the 
Act's definition of "audiovisual work" 
which, in part, requires "a series of re-
lated images,"54 found that the teletext 
material, which could not be seen to-
gether with the nine o'clock news, was 
not part of the same "series of related 
images" as the news program. 55 Thus, 
United Video was entitled to an exemp-
tion under § 111(a)(3) with regard to 
the retransmission of the nine o'clock 
news program.56 
On appeal, however, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit reversed this decision.57 Al-
though the appellate court agreed that 
United Video would be exerting con-
trol over the primary transmission 
"only if WON's copyright of the nine 
o'clock news includes the teletext in the 
vertical blanking intervals," it disputed 
the district court's finding that the news 
program and the teletext were not "re-
lated images" copyrightable as a single 
audiovisual work. The court found that 
the two sources of information 
amounted to a "two-channel" news 
program, both channels of which were 
"intended to be seen by the same view-
ers" who could switch back and forth 
between the sources with the decoder. 
Thus United Video was not an exempt 
carrier, for in stripping out WON's 
teletext, it had exerted control over the 
copyrighted material constituting the 
primary transmission. 58 
In view of the carrier's intended role 
as a non-interfering message "conduit," 
Congress could not have meant for the 
common carrier exemption to apply to 
a carrier that removes a portion of a 
broadcaster's message and replaces it 
with material from another source, as 
was done in WON. Unlike EMl's 
retransmission, United Video's retrans-
mission was not "passive." Thus, on 
the facts, EMI and WON are distin-
guishable. However, the two opinions 
have produced inconsistent definitions 
of the term, "primary transmission." 
In EMI, the nature of the carrier's 
retransmission was not at issue. Both 
the district and circuit courts defined 
"primary transmission" as simply "the 
signal broadcast" by a television station. 59 
In WON, however, the addition of 
teletext to the broadcast signal forced 
the courts to more closely examine the 
concept of a "primary transmission." 
The Act, itself, was of little help. Even 
though § 111(f) purports to define a 
"primary transmission," the definition 
focuses only on the word "primary." 
Section 111 (f) defines "primary trans-
mission" as "a transmission made to 
the public by the transmitting facility 
whose signals are being received and 
further transmitted by the secondary 
transmission service .... "60 Left to its 
own interpretive resources, the WON 
district court determined that the 
phrase, "control over the primary 
transmission," meant control over the 
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copyrighted program,61 even though the 
court admitted that the phrase "could 
easily mean either alteration of the 
signal or editing of the program. "62 
By defining "primary transmission" 
as it did, however, the district court 
(and later, the appellate court) had to 
determine whether the two works, the 
news program and the original teletext, 
constituted a single copyrightable audio-
visual work comprised of a "series of 
related images."63 This inquiry was also 
fraught with interpretive problems 
inasmuch as the Act defines neither 
"series" nor "related." 
The uSame Viewer /Same 
Time" Test 
The district court concluded that the 
teletext and nine o'clock news "were 
not intended to be viewed together as a 
single work by the same viewer at the 
same time," and thus did not constitute 
one copyrightable audiovisual work.64 
On appeal, the circuit court applied the 
same test, but disagreed with the dis-
trict court's conclusion and held in-
stead that the two works were intended 
to be seen at the same time by the same 
viewers. The court hypothesized that if 
teletext news were broadcast during "a 
cartoon show for preschoolers," the 
two works would not then be "related 
images. "65 
The so-called "same viewer/same 
time" test applied by both courts in 
WGN is inadequate to determine the 
copyrightability of teletext and televi-
sion programs as a single "audiovisual 
work." By providing no guidelines for 
determining when two works were "in-
tended to be seen by the same viewers," 
the test merely invites judicial conjec-
ture. The WGN appellate court itself 
demonstrated the likelihood of widely 
inconsistent decisions under the test 
when it announced that WGN's teletext 
containing local Chicago news and 
weather was intended to be seen by the 
same cable viewers as were watching the 
WGN national news in Albuquerque, 
New Mexico. Further, the WGN same 
viewer / same time test has the practical 
effect of forcing a carrier to retransmit 
all teletext broadcast by a station even if 
the carrier has no way of knowing if the 
teletext might unexpectantly become 
"unrelated" to the main program. 
In view of the fact that § 111 second-
ary transmission exemptions were de-
signed to protect cable television and 
common carriers, it makes little sense 
to apply such a "loose and spongy" ex-
emption eligibility test as the one app-
lied in WGN.66 While it is true that 
Congress intended the Copyright Act 
of 1976 to be applied to new technolo-
gies,67 teletext broadcasting has raised a 
carrier exemption problem that cannot 
be satisfactorily resolved under the 
Act's current wording and legislative 
history. 
The solution is, of course, a statutory 
one. Now that the television and cable 
industries have recognized the potential 
for teletext broadcasting,68 so must 
Congress. If, upon investigation, Con-
gress determines that teletext is as de-
serving of protection as CATV was, 
then it should enact new or clarifying 
legislation to safeguard teletext's future 
in the competitive broadcast industry. 
Should Congress determine that com-
mon carrier interference substantially 
threatens the wide-spread development 
of teletext systems, a simple solution 
would be to redraft the definition of 
"primary transmission" to mean "the 
entire broadcast signal," so that any car-
rier interference with the teletext would 
constitute "control over the primary 
transmission" under § 111(a)(3) of the 
Act. 
On the other hand, should Congress 
determine that teletext broadcasts are 
too disruptive of the CATV/carrier 
copyright scheme to merit special 
protection, it might add to the Act a 
definition of the word "series" that 
does not contemplate two simultaneously 
telecast programs. Congress might also 
expressly restrict the copyrightability of 
teletext broadcast simultaneously with 
a main program to that style of teletext 
that appears only at the bottom of the 
television screen during the featured 
program. 
Some congressional action with re-
gard to teletext transmissions is neces-
sary to afford common carriers clear 
notice of what conduct constitutes 
impermissible "control of the primary 
transmission." Such legislation will 
restore needed stability to the common 
carrier exemption that was lost after the 
WGN decision. 
Conclusion 
The passive carrier exemption under 
§111(a)(3) of the Act should be 
construed to maximize the free flow of 
varied program material to CATV sys-
tems while ensuring that the carrier is 
truly a "passive" intermediary that 
neither adds nor subtracts from the 
primary transmission and selects its au-
dience only on the basis of legitimate 
business reasons.69 
With the introduction of teletext 
broadcasts into the carrier exemption 
scheme, a strong need exists for con-
gressional action aimed at clarifying the 
parameters of carrier "control" over 
teletext broadcasts. Such clarification 
will result in more consistent judicial 
application of the common carrier ex-
emption, which in turn will benefit 
both carriers and copyright owners 
alike by providing them with clear op-
erational guidelines. ~ 
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Invisible Teachers 
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recognize these facts is indicative of the 
caricature to which they are so power-
fully impelled. 
Another example of the same per-
ceptual quirk is the belief that law 
teachers try to hurt students' feelings in 
class. Many students see their teachers 
as a self-selected group of the meanest 
of the legal profession, a group that 
seems to get a personal thrill out of 
brow beating students. Every reason-
able answer begets just another ques-
tion, and it is frustrating and embaras-
sing to be put on the spot. But to 
conclude, because of such feelings, that 
the teacher is trying to hurt is for the 
student to confuse his personal re-
actions with the motives of the 
professor. It is to ignore the teacher as a 
person in his own right, with his own 
objectives. The teacher's aim is to 
enable the student to respond under 
pressure, even in situations where at 
first the student thinks he has no 
response. The objective is to encourage 
the student to think and communicate 
even more precisely and effectively than 
he thought he could. Law students are 
in training to be professional advocates 
and counselors. For a professional, 
arguments cannot be merely adequate 
or normal or bright. Lawyers are paid 
to be always clear and sometimes 
moving and brilliant in their communi-
cations; they must meet this profes-
sional obligation even when they feel 
embarrassed, even when they are 
distracted, even when at first they think 
they have no response. 
A third example is the belief that the 
teacher knows everything. I hesitate to 
mention this particular misperception 
as it does not normally last past the 
third week of classes. At first impres-
sion this perception seems inconsistent 
with my model because it appears to 
acknowledge and enlarge the capacities 
of the teacher. But the real reason 
students want to believe their teachers 
know everything is to justify their 
conclusion that it is unreasonable to 
expect them to live up to the standard 
the teacher appears to set. If a teacher 
commands a kind of superhuman 
excellence or perfection, students are 
excused from paying attention to the 
standards he is trying to communicate. 
In short, he can be ignored. In fact, of 
course, teachers do not normally ask 
questions if they are sure of the 
answers. They are ultimately seeking to 
interest students in questions that they 
34-The Law Forum/Spring, I984 
find interesting, important, and diffi-
cult to answer. The teacher thinks that 
the questions he puts are hard questions, 
that they are worthy of students' 
attention and thought because they are 
hard. He surely does not often assume 
that there are clear answers to the 
questions, let alone that he holds the 
answers. 
A fourth variation on this theme is 
the belief that teachers are single-
mindedly interested in legal thinking, in 
legal problems, in law. They have no 
self doubts, and they arrogantly insist 
that students master the profession's 
conventions and skills even when they 
do not want to. The teacher does not 
seem to know about other needs, does 
not recognize that all this seriousness 
will corrupt pleasant, fun-loving per-
sonalities. He does not sense that there 
is something a bit narrow and even 
threatening about how lawyers think. In 
short, the teacher is a reduced person 
with reduced vision who sees little of 
the broader world. 
The truth is that many teachers are 
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already mastered the skills that they are 
trying to impart and are familiar with 
the conventions of the profession. They 
know that putting legal skills into 
action can do a lot of harm. They have 
seen legal arguments intensify and even 
initiate disagreements rather than re~ 
solve them; they have seen students 
who-having just learned to say "inter 
alia" or divide their arguments into 
three numbered sections (and even 
perhaps remember the third part of the 
argument )-feel that because of these 
skills they have somehow become 
superior to other citizens; they have 
seen first~year law students disdain the 
"fuzzy" thinking of other citizens and 
even of their spouses and friends, so 
that they exhibit an aggresive over~ 
confidence that is sometimes never 
outgrown; they are well aware of judges 
who think that some special skill 
entitles them to a superior place in the 
resolution of social problems. Teachers 
may love their craft and the skills of 
their profession, but they are at least as 
aware of the limitations as anyone else. 
They spend a great deal of their 
academic effort questioning basic as~ 
sumptions about how law is used, at 
attempting to locate the limitations of 
law. They want students to master the 
techniques and then to transcend them. 
Sooner or later (and this mispercep~ 
tion tends to last indefinitely) many 
students come to believe that their 
teachers know nothing, are not there at 
all. The most common version of this 
belief is that teachers are not interested 
in practical things. Put bluntly, students 
adopt this attitude because their teachers 
insist that they continue thinking about 
problems when they are tired of them. 
Students and alumni criticize teachers 
as "too abstract," "too impractical," 
"too academic," but these are merely 
euphemisms for exasperation. Most law 
teachers have practiced law, many still 
do, and some will go back to the 
practice full time. Of course, the 
faculty's academic interests may differ 
from the students' interests from time 
to time, but there is no real doubt that 
the skills being taught are generally the 
skills needed in practice. Law students 
are taught to be precise, to develop the 
capacity to forsee potential weaknesses 
in their own arguments, to be orderly, 
to be complete, to be imaginative in the 
construction of legal arguments. These 
are the intellectual skills that the 
practice of law requires. 
Another version of the belief that the 
teacher knows nothing is the distres~ 
singly common view that law teachers 
are trying to convince their students 
that there are always two sides to every 
argument. Many law students believe 
they have seen deeply into the purposes 
of legal education when they conclude 
that anyone argument is as good as any 
other, that the important thing is just to 
be able to come up with an argument. 
Students might come to this conclusion 
because teachers tend to raise additional 
questions in response to most answers. 
The perceived message is that the 
student is to learn to make an 
argument, any argument; one must be 
as good as another since there are 
problems with all arguments. This 
perception is almost completely wrong. 
Teachers, of course, question answers 
so that students will learn to discover 
possible weaknesses in even their 
strongest arguments. Moreover, most 
teachers want students to be able to 
judge quality for themselves. They do 
not make a habit of telling students 
when their answers are "right" because 
a lawyer must learn to judge indepen~ 
dently, by his own standards, when an 
argument is good enough. The point of 
all those questions is, in fact, to show 
students how to judge quality in 
argument, not to urge the view that 
quality is irrelevant. 
I do not mean these observations to 
be self~serving. There is some truth in 
all the misperceptions that I have 
described. Every faculty member has 
many weaknesses, as does legal educa~ 
tion in general. But the misperceptions 
distort-even oppose-what I think 
most law teachers know to be true. In 
this way they illustrate how powerful is 
the urge that students feel to diminish 
their teachers. Legal education is still 
fairly rigorous, and it involves many 
real frustrations and disappointments. 
Only some of these are caused by 
faculty members. To caricature and 
ultimately to try to eliminate the 
teacher that stands in front of them is a 
way for students to make the teacher 
responsible for all the difficulties 
associated with becoming educated in 
law. Law students in this regard only 
share (and perhaps enlarge) the near 
universal desire of students to avoid 
taking responsibility for their own 
education. Sadly, like any group subject 
to fairly constant misperception, 
teachers are under pressure to in~ 
ternalize the distorted image of them~ 
selves reflected in their students' eyes. 
Much of the malaise in legal education 
today may be as much a consequence of 
the resulting personal unhappiness as it 
is of any real ineffectiveness inherent in 
prevalent teaching techniques. 
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